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I. Recent Changes to the Refugee Protection System in Hong Kong'
On June 9, 2013, from a hotel in Hong Kong, Edward Snowden, a former contractor
for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), revealed himself as the source behind the
controversial surveillance program leaks to the media. 2 Snowden first selected Hong
Kong, even after Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, informed him that it would be
"very unlikely [for Snowden] to have received asylum in Hong Kong for a variety of politi-
cal and bureaucratic reasons." 3 Assange knew what every refugee in Hong Kong is faced
with when arriving to the island; the refugee system is slow, bureaucratic, and inefficient. 4
Fearing the consequences of such protracted immigration proceedings, Snowden left
Hong Kong.5 Earlier this year, however, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal-the
court with final adjudication power on the laws of Hong Kong-in C, KMF, BF v. Director
of Immigration, found the government's practice of merely "tak[ing] into account" refugee
status determinations made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) without itself making a timely investigation and determination into whether
the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in the event of return to "fall far
short" of "reasonable" "judicial review."' 6 This monumental decision has led the Hong
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1. Prepared by Montse Ferrer, Esq., associate in the Litigation and Dispute Resolution department,
Clifford Chance, Hong Kong.
2. Interview by Laura Poitras & Glenn Greenwald with Edward Snowden, NSA fWhistleblower Edward
Snowden: 'I Don't Want to Live in a Society That Does These Sort of Things' video, THE GUARDIAN (June 9,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/Jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edward-snowden-inter-
view-video.
3. Lana Lam & Ben Garvey, Assange: Hong Kong Would Have 'Played by the Book' Over Edward Snowden, S.




6. C, KMF, BF v. Dir. of Immigration, [2013] 4 H.K.C. 563, T 65, available at http://www.refworld.org/
publisher,HKCFA,,,5 15010a52,0.html.
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Kong government to announce an intention to overhaul the current refugee system, 7 pro-
viding a sliver of hope to the many refugees passing through one of the largest financial
hubs in the world.
In seeking protection from removal (or refoulement), refugees in Hong Kong rely on
one of two legal avenues. The first one is the Refugee Status Determination (RSD)
screening mechanism overseen by the UNHCR office in Hong Kong.8 Although China
ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)9
and its 1967 Protocol, 1 Hong Kong has held firm to a policy against granting asylum to
refugees since 2000, resisting the application of the Refugee Convention and its 1967
Protocol.I Instead, the Hong Kong government entered into a Memorandum of Under-
standing with the UNHCR in 2009, delegating the assessment of refugee claims to the
UNHCR-a decision that, according to Philip Karani (the head of Hong Kong's
UNHCR office), is "unique among developed jurisdictions."' 2 The UNHCR's RSD pro-
cess is reported to be fraught with procedural problems and lacking the resources neces-
sary to properly perform its delegated duties.' 3 As a result, a final decision on refugee
status frequently takes up to five years, 4 and during this period, asylum seekers have no
legal right to work or volunteer and must rely on minimal welfare assistance that has been
7. See SECURITY BUREAU PANEL ON SECURITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LC PAPER No.
CB(2)1465/12-13(01), SCREENING OF NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS 9-11 (2013), availahle at http://
www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/panels/se/papers/seO 702cb2-1465-1-e.pdf
8. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China): 2014 UNHCR
Regional Operations Profile-East Asia and the Pacific, availahie at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e488026.hrml
(last visited Jan. 27, 2014).
9. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150,
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be0lb964.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. For a list of countries that have ratified the Refugee Con-
vention, see UNITED NATIONS, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsll.aspx?&src=UNTSONgINE&
mtdsg no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en (last visited Jan 26, 2014).
10. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.S.T. 267 (entered
into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. For a list of countries that have ratified the Refugee
Protocol, see UNITED NATIONS, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTSON-
LINE&tabid=2&mtdsg no=V-5&chapter=5&lang=en#Participants (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
11. See Kelley Loper, Human Rights, Non-Refoulement and the Protection ofRefugees in Hong Kong, 22 INT'L J.
OF REFUGEE L. 404, 405 (2010); see also U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Comm. on
Econ., Social & Cultural Rights, Rep. on its 34th Sess., Apr. 25-May 13, 2005, T 80, E/C. 12/l/Add.107
(May 13, 2005), availahle at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7 b4043c1256a450044f33 1/a206bff
cd68c76blc125700500478168/$FILE/G0542245.pdfi
12. Te-Ping Chen, Hong Kong Changing the Way It Handles Refugees, WALL STREETJ. (July 16, 2013), http:/
/online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 1000142412 7887324694904578601171702287356.
13. See HONG KONG REFUGEE ADVICE CENTRE, LC PAPER No. CB(2)1669/12-13(02), RESPONSE TO
THE INVITATION FOR SUBMISSIONS BY THE PANEL ON SECURITY TO GIVE WRITTEN VIEWS ON THE AD
MINISTRATION'S PROPOSED UNIFIED MECHANISM FOR SCREENING OF NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS
(2013), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrl2-13/english/panels/se/papers/seO702cb2-1669-2-e.pdf; see
also Loper, supra note 11, at 415.
14. The most prominent organization in Hong Kong providing pro bono legal services to refugees, the
Hong Kong Refugee Advice Centre, reports that asylum-seekers frequently have to wait up to five years for
interviews with the UNHCR. See Refugee Law in Hong Kong, HONG KONG REFUGEE ADVICE CENTRE,
http://www.hkrac.org/refugees-in-hong-kong/refugee-law-in-hong-kong/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2014); see also
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deemed by many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) aiding refugees to be inade-
quate for the cost of living in Hong Kong.'
The second screening mechanism available to refugees is a screening mechanism for
torture claimants set up by the Hong Kong government to meet its obligations under the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment (CAT),16 extended to Hong Kong in 1992.17 The CAT mechanism, like the
RSD, has also received heavy criticism, in large part due to its low rate of recognition;
since 1992, 12,555 asylum seekers have filed claims with Hong Kong's Immigration De-
partment, but only nine claimants have been granted refugee status as of June 30, 2013.18
Further, as a matter of policy, refugees cannot submit a torture claim to the Hong Kong
Director of Immigration unless they have "overstayed" their visas, effectively forcing such
individuals to commit an immigration offense before they can file a torture claim.' 9
The refugee system's deficiencies have long been criticized and challenged by NGOs,
refugee lawyers, and, most recently, by Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal. On March
25, 2013, in C, KMB, BF v. Director of Immigration, the Court of Final Appeal unanimously
concluded that despite there being neither a statutory obligation nor an application of the
Refugee Convention, Hong Kong's accepted policy not to remove, or refoule, refugee
claimants whose fear of persecution is well-founded, needs to be independently and judi-
cially reviewed by the Director of Immigration. 20 In particular, the Court of Final Appeal
found that the current review by the Director of Immigration primarily delegated to the
UNHCR "falls short of the anxious scrutiny and high standards of fairness required by
[law] ."21
Following this monumental decision of the Court of Final Appeal and Edward
Snowden's subsequent arrival in Hong Kong (which prompted a media flurry exposing
and magnifying the enumerated deficiencies of the Hong Kong refugee system), the Hong
Kong government announced on July 2, 2013, its plan to introduce a Unified Screening
Mechanism (USM), based on the existing statutory CAT claim screening mechanism, that
would allow claimants to present all grounds of their non-refoulement claims through one
15. See Aleta Miller, Don't Starve Refugees of the Fruit of Honest Labour, S. CHINA MORNING POST (May 1,
2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinron/article/1227013/dont-starve-refugees-
fruit-honest-labour; see also Wilfred Chan, Hong Kong's 'Shameful' Treatment of Refugees Exposed, CNN (July
18, 2013, 5:07 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/18/world/asia/hong-kong-refugees-exposed/; Joyce
Man, Hong Kong: No Friend to Asylum Seekers, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 18, 2013, 10:36 AM), http://www.
theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/hong-kong-no-friend-to-asylum-seekers/274107/.
16. See Loper, supra note 11, at 404.
17. See M. EvANS, A. HALLO DE WOLF, R. MURRAY & E. STEINERTE, THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO
THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 78 (2011).
18. See Sonya Donnelly, Towards a Unified Protection System for Hong Kong, HUM. RTS. IN IR. (Aug. 19,
2013), http://humanrights.ie/children-and-the-law/towards-a-unified-protection-system-for-hong-kong/; see
also Is Hong Kong Turning a Blind Eye to Torture?, ASIAXPAT (Jan. 2013), http://hongkong.asiaxpat.com/on-
location/is-hong-kong-turning-a-blind-eye-to-torture.html; True Love Beats the Culture of Rejection, VIsIoN
FIRST (Aug. 13, 2013), http://visionfirsmow.org/tag/convention-against-torture/.
19. See Edward Snowden: An Opportunity to Reflect on the Refugee Protection System in Hong Kong, H.K. REFU
GEE ADVICE CENTRE (June 11, 2013), http://www.hkrac.org/11-june-2013-edward-snowden-what-protec-
tion-can-the-hong-kong-legal-system-offer/.
20. C, KMF, BF, 4 H.K.C. 88-90.
21. Id. T 97.
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screening mechanism. 22 Further details and the implementation of the USM are expected
to be presented in 2014. The renewed hopes of refugees and those supporting their
claims and welfare rest squarely on the government's USM proposal. This proposal could
be an opportunity for the Hong Kong government to reverse over a decade of inefficiency
and disappointments, but it could also simply be a mechanism that streamlines the refugee
system without resolving the current underlying challenges. If it chooses the former,
Hong Kong would be setting an example for its neighbors and other industrialized
nations.
II. The Dublin Regulation: Changes Under Dublin III*
The protection of refugees and asylum seekers has been a binding international respon-
sibility since the early 1950s, with the introduction of the Geneva Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees of 1951.23 "Any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular so-
cial group or political opinion" has, inter alia, a right under this Convention to be granted
international protection in the signatory States. 24 While the Refugee Convention dates
back to the middle of the twentieth century, the European Union (EU) has only addressed
asylum and refugee matters since the 1980s 25 and 1990s. 26 Since then, Europe has seen
the Dublin Convention grow into the Dublin II Regulation, 27 followed by the Dublin III
Regulation,28 in attempts to balance protection for asylum seekers and the consequent
burden imposed on Member States (MS). This article will outline the major changes that
occurred from Dublin II to Dublin III, which came into effect on July 19, 2013.29
A. DUBLIN II
Dublin II was adopted on February 18, 2003, by the Council of the European Union, as
part of the project to create a Common European Asylum System (CEAS).30 The main
22. SECURITY BUREAU PANEL ON SECURITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 7, T9 9-11.
* Victoria Smythies holds a Juris Doctorate from the University of Alabama and an LL.M. in
International Law from the University of Vienna with Distinction.
23. Refugee Convention, supra note 9.
24. Id. art. 1A(2).
25. Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 14, 1985,
Belg.-Fr.-F.R.G.-Lux.-Neth., 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991); see also, Lars Bay Larsen, Schengen, the Third Pillar and
Nordic Cooperation, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCHENGEN: FIRST THE WIDENING, Now THE DEEPEN
rNC 17 (Monica den Boer ed., 1997).
26. The Dublin Convention entered into force on October 1, 1997, in Sweden and Austria, and on January
1, 1998, in Finland. Dublin Convention, 1997 OJ. (L254) 1 (E.C.).
27. The Dublin II Regulation 343/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2003 OJ. (L 50)
1, availahle at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:PDF
(last visited Jan. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Dublin II].
28. The Dublin III Regulation 604/2013, of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2013 OJ. (L
180) 31, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:
PDF (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Dublin II].
29. Victoria Smythies & Lara Ramazzotti, The Dublin Regulation A Critical Examination ofa Troubled System,
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW (Aug. 26, 2013, 3:09 AM), http://internationalrefugeelaw.wordpress.com/
2013/08/26/the-dublin-regulation-a-critical-examination-of-a-troubled-system.
30. Dublin II, at 1.
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goal of Dublin II was to provide a set of criteria whereby the appropriate MS might be
assigned responsibility for the examination of an asylum application at the European
level.3 While improvements provided by Dublin II in terms of speed and effectiveness of
the European asylum mechanisms were undeniable, other outcomes were of great con-
cern. First and foremost, Dublin II appeared to impose an unfair mechanism of burden
sharing among MS. Indeed, the UNHCR clearly pointed out this aspect just two years
after its adoption: "[t]he Dublin II Regulation . . . does not contain any mechanism to
ensure that responsibilities are shared in a balanced or equitable manner .... In particular
the criterion of illegal border crossing might place a disproportionate responsibility on
States at the external borders of the Union. ' 3 In illustration of this point, the last several
years have seen a comparatively high number of refugee applications in some countries of
Eastern and Southern Europe. Thus, "Greece had fewer than 1,000 reception places
available in 2010, yet received over 10,000 new asylum applications, ' 33 and in Malta in
2012, 21.7 asylum requests per 1,000 inhabitants were submitted, whilst the average in the
European Union for the same year was 2.6. 3 4 In the light of these results, the system
implemented by Dublin II could be effectively described as a burden shifting rather than a
burden sharing among MS. Second, the application, without any previous or further ver-
ification of the mechanisms set up by Dublin II-and in particular the so-called "auto-
matic mutual trust" criterion between MS-could imply the violation of the essential
principle of non-refoulement. Thus, Dublin II permitted a MS that was not the responsi-
ble party to examine the applications and return a rejected asylum seeker to the first Euro-
pean country he/she entered, but it did not provide for a mandatory suspension of this
mechanism in case of systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure of the latter.35 Third,
the differences between the asylum systems of MS have never ceased to be considerable,
despite the fact that Dublin II was adopted as part of a broader project aimed at establish-
ing "[a] common policy on asylum" in Europe as well as "an area of freedom, security and
justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the
Community." 36
31. The first and most relevant among these criteria is that "the Member State responsible ... shall be
determined on the basis of the situation obtaining when the asylum seeker first lodged his application with a
Member State." Id. art. 5(2). Art. 10(1) of Dublin II adds that "where it is established ... that an asylum
seeker has irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, sea or air having come from a third
country, the member state thus entered shall be responsible for examining the application for asylum." Id.
art. 10(1).
32. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, The Dublin II Regulation, a UNHCR Discussion Paper 1 (Apr. 2006),
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4445fe344.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
33. PAUL McDONOUGH & EVANGELINA TSOURDI, UNITED NATIONS HiGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES,
PUTTING SOLIDARITY TO THE TEST: ASSESSING EUROPE'S RESPONSE TO THE ASYLUM CRISIS IN GREECE
(2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4f269d5f9.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
34. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCRAsylum Trends 2012: Levels and Trends in Industrialized Coun-
tries (Mar. 21, 2013), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/514ad4e02.html.
35. Two different judgements in 2011 (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09 of the European
Court of Human Rights and N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department of the EU Court ofJustice,
C-411/10) practically abolish the principle of automatic mutual trust among MS and prohibit the return of an
asylum seekers to a country where the deficiencies of the asylum system amount to breach of human rights.
36. Dublin II, T 1.
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Taken together, therefore, after more than ten years, Dublin II had widely demon-
strated its powerlessness to achieve its goals. The consequence was a veritable "asylum
lottery" for most of the applicants. 37
B. DUBLIN III
In the years since the implementation of Dublin II, several national courts have ex-
amined the effectiveness of its application. "[T]he judgment of the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights in MSS v. Greece and Belgium 38 highlights the array of
issues faced by the [European Union] with regard to its asylum obligations," 39 finding that
EU law was essentially "incompatible with the fundamental obligations that [MS] owed to
those seeking protection under international law."40 "A key aspect of the judgment was its
criticism of [Dublin] II which include inter alia (i) that [Dublin II] created disproportion-
ate burden on certain MS," and (ii) that Dublin II "is based on shared minimum standard
within the" European Union for "standards of detention and procedures." 4 1 Conse-
quently, the court found, "a large proportion of asylum seekers have been shifted to the
[EU] peripheral countries," 4 "impos[ing] untenable pressure on those states situated
along Europe's borders: 'gateway' countries such as Poland, Spain, Italy and Greece." 43
In addition, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the case of N.S v.
Secretary of State Jbr the Home Department, stated
the Member States, including the national courts, may not transfer an asylum seeker
to the 'Member State responsible' within the meaning of Regulation No 343/2003
where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and
in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to sub-
stantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the
Charter.44
The court's judgment clarified that the EU asylum system cannot operate on the basis
of a "conclusive presumption" that all MS in the European Union "observe the fundamen-
tal rights of the European Union. ' 45 Moreover, the judgment confirmed that MS are
indeed responsible for implementing the provisions of the EU asylum system to suitable
37. Joanna Lenart, 'Fortress Europe': Compliance of the Dublin II Regulation with the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamentals Freedoms, MERKOURIOS UTRECHT J. INT'L & EUR L. 1, 12
(2012), availahle at http://www.utrechtjournal.org/article/view/3O/O.
38. See generally M.S.S., 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 108.
39. Smythies & Ramazzotti, supra note 29.
40. LOUISE ARIMATSU & MARiKA GILES SA-MSON, CHATHAM HOUSE BRIEFING PAPER, THE UN REFU
GEE CONVENTION AT 60: THE CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE 2 (2011), available at http://www.chathamihouse.
org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/03 1 lbparimatsu samson.pdf.
41. Smythies & Ramazzotti, supra note 29.
42. Id.
43. ARPIATSU & SAMSON, supra note 40, at 8.
44. Joined Cases C-411/10, N. S. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, and C-493/10, M. E. v. Refugee
Applications Comm'r, Minister for Justice, Equal. and Law Reform, 2011 E.C.R. 1-0000, T 94, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsftext=&docid= 117187 &pagelndex=0&doclang=EN&
mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part= 1&cid=43817.
45. Id. T 105.
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standards and that a failure to do so may bring them into conflict with their international
legal obligations. 46
In 2008, in an attempt to address the problematic and controversial consequences of the
implementation of Dublin II, discussions started at European levels that have led to the
adoption of a new set of rules through Dublin III,47 which entered into force on July 19,
2013.48 Notably, the EU Commission proposed a mechanism to correct the inefficiency
of Dublin II that had resulted in overburdening "certain Member States with limited re-
ception and absorption capacities," as well as a lack of "adequate standards of protection in
the responsible Member State, in particular in terms of reception conditions and access to
the asylum procedure." 49 This new procedure would have allowed a temporary "suspen-
sion of Dublin transfers towards the responsible Member State" under these circum-
stances, but the Council's amendments abolished the proposal.50 Nevertheless, Article 33
does outline a mechanism "for early warning, preparedness and crisis management" al-
though "the responsibility relies heavily with the MS facing crisis."'" Thus, the success of
Dublin III "will rely upon further action taken by MS. '5 2
Protection for refugees and asylum seekers has been advanced by Dublin III through a
number of new provisions. Dublin III now ensures that asylum seekers have a right of
appeal against a Dublin decision before they can be transferred s3 To this end, the asylum
seeker must be informed about the Dublin process before it starts and must be interviewed
(with an interpreter if needed) to ensure his/her knowledge of the process before, and
completely separate from, any interview concerning the actual claim for asylum. 4 Al-
though the Home Office may have used this two-step process in the past, its use is now a
requirement.55 Dublin III also provides for the first time a general rule about detention,5 6
stating that, in general, people should not be detained just because there is a plan for a
Dublin transfer; they should only be detained if there is a "significant risk of abscond-
ing."5st Additionally, there is a slight "reduction of the time-frame within which a country
can attempt a Dublin transfer." 8 Under Dublin III, the country where a person is located
has (generally speaking) three months from the time that an asylum-seeker comes to their
attention to make a Dublin transfer request to another EU country.59 Under Dublin III,
46. Id.
47. See generally Dublin III, supra note 28.
48. Smythies & Ramazzotti, supra note 29.
49. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament ad of the Council Establishing the Criteria
and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsihle for Examining an Application for International Pro-
tection Lodged in One of the Memher States by a Third-County National or a Stateless Person, at 10, COM (2008)
820 final (Mar. 12, 2008), availahle at http://www.refworld.org/docid/493e8e3a2.html.
50. Id.
51. Dublin III, supra note 28, art. 33; Smythies & Ramazzotti, supra note 29.
52. Smythies & Ramazzotti, supra note 29.
53. Dublin III, supra note 28, art. 27.
54. Id. T 18.
55. Robert Swinfen, Third Country Cases: Dublin III Regulations Compared to Dublin II, NCADC LEGAL
RESOURCES (Oct. 17, 2013), http://ncadc.org.uk/legal/third-country-cases-dublin-iii-regulations-compared-
to-dublin-ii.
56. Dublin III, supra note 28, art. 28.
57. Id. art. 28(2).
58. Swinfen, supra note 55.
59. Dublin III, supra note 28, art. 2 1(1).
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if the reason for the transfer is a fingerprint match under Eurodacs, this is reduced to two
months.
60
Dublin III has also sought to assist those asylum seekers who are under the age of
eighteen, especially unaccompanied minors, through the introduction of new rules that
"make unwanted transfers much less likely for this group."61 Finally, Dublin III provides
"a wider definition of family, which means that unaccompanied minors should be reunited
with uncles, aunts, grandparents, or brothers and sisters, as well as parents-as long as this
is 'in their best interests.' "62
While Dublin III marks a pivotal evolution of the advance of human rights for refugees
and asylum seekers through the creation of the CEAS, it remains to be seen how each MS
will apply the regulation. Implementation of Dublin III by MS "is the crucial step that
will influence" an advance in "the rights of asylum seekers and most severely impact their
ability to seek protection in Europe." 63
III. Gang-Related Asylum in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit: Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder*
Earlier this year, the en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, incrementally widening the scope for asylum to certain victims
of gang-related violence on account of membership in a particular social group. 64 This
decision is noteworthy for the following reasons: (1) the Ninth Circuit broadened the
Board of Immigration Appeal's (BIA) requirements to demonstrate membership in a Par-
ticular Social Group (PSG) insofar as it relates to victims of gang-violence; (2) the court
overturned its prior case law and adopted an interpretation for membership in a PSG that
further widened the circuit court split on this issue; and (3) whereas the court did not
overtly adopt the UNHCR's position that the BIA is misapplying the definition for a
PSG, it agreed with the minority circuit court opinion that the BIA has applied its defini-
tion in an inconsistent and unclear manner. 65
In Henriquez-Rivas, the petitioner essentially witnessed her father's murder in El Salva-
dor by members of the M- 18 gang when she was twelve years old.66 She testified against
the gang members in El Salvador court criminal proceedings. 67 Afterward, she was
threatened by some of the M-18 gang members and, fearing for her life, she fled to the
United States and applied for asylum. 6 In order to qualify for asylum, pursuant to the
definition of "refugee" in Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), petitioner Henriquez-Rivas was required to prove a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
60. Id.
61. Id. T 13 (stating that "specific procedural guarantees for unaccompanied minors should be laid down on
account of their particular vulnerability"). Swinfen, supra note 55.
62. Dublin III, supra note 28, art. 16; Swinfen, supra note 55.
63. Smytbies & Ramazzotti, supra note 29.
* Deepali V. Lugani, Immigration and Naturalization Attorney and Founder of Lugani Law Firm.
64. See generally Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013).
65. Id. at 1088.
66. Id. at 1085-86.
67. Id. at 1086.
68. Id.
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particular social group and lack of protection in her country of origin.69 The INA
adopted the definition of refugee from the Refugee Convention70 and its 1967 Protocol,71
to which the United States is a party. The BIA rejected petitioner's proposed social
group-people testifying against or otherwise opposing gang members-and denied her
application for asylum for failing to meet the social visibility and particularity require-
ments for PSG.72 Petitioner challenged the BIN's decision at the Ninth Circuit.73
A background of the definition of PSG is in order. Neither the Refugee Convention
and its 1967 Protocol nor the INA define the term "PSG." Domestically, the scope and
application of the PSG has developed through case law at the BIA and federal circuit
courts. In 1985, in Matter ofAcosta, the BIA first defined membership in a PSG as perse-
cution directed toward an individual as member of a group that shares common and im-
mutable characteristics-either innate ones such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or common
ones such as shared past experience, like land ownership or former military leadership.74
The BIA held that the construction of those characteristics would be determined on a
case-by-case basis.75
In 2005, the BIA clarified this definition in In re C-A-.6 The BIA held that asylum
seekers must also demonstrate the additional requirements of social visibility and particu-
larity of their group, along with immutability as defined in Acosta, in order to meet the
criteria of a particular social group.77 The BIA then rejected asylum claims for proposed
social groups that failed to show social visibility and particularity of their group despite
demonstrating common and shared characteristic between members of the group.78
Under international refugee law, pursuant to its statute, the UNHCR issues interpreta-
tive guidelines for terms contained in international refugee instruments, including the
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, for consistent and harmonious application of
terms in Member States.79 UNHCR's Social Group Guidelines (UNHCR's Guidelines)
adopted the following two alternate approaches for establishing membership in a particu-
lar social group: the protected characteristics approach (individuals that share immutable
or fundamental characteristics as part of a group) and the social perception approach (indi-
69. Id. at 1083.
70. Refugee Convention, supra note 9, art. 1A.
71. Refugee Protocol, supra note 10, art. 1(2).
72. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2013).
73. Id. at 1086-87.
74. In reAcosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211,232,233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruledon other grounds by In re Mogharrabi,
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
75. Id. at 233.
76. In re C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 951, 957, 960 (B.I.A. 2006), affd 24 1. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008).
77. Id. at 955.
78. In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting Hondurans who refused gang recruit-
ment for lacking social visibility in society); In re Henriquez-Rivas, No. A098 660 718 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding
that persons that testify against gang members fail to meet the social visibility and particularity standard); In
re C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 951, 957, 959 (holding that informants of a Columbian drug cartel failed to meet the
social visibility or particularity requirement); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 588 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding that
individuals resisting gang recruitment lack the social visibility and particularity requirement); Ramos v. Holder,
589 F.3d 426, 429-30 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the BIA held that former gang member are not a particular
social group for lack of social visibility).
79. United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees' Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner at 1-2,
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 09-71571).
SPRING 2014
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
368 THE YEAR IN REVIEW
viduals with common characteristics that set them apart and who are perceived as a group
in society). 80
UNHCR's Guidelines state that the BIA's definition of PSG in Acosta is the protected
characteristics approach.81 Further, the UNHCR states that the BIA's reformulated defi-
nition of PSG in C-A- is a combination of protected characteristics and social perception
approaches. The UNHCR takes the position that the BIA erroneously requires refugees
to demonstrate both requirements and that refugees should have to meet only one of the
two definitions to receive protection in the United States. According to the UNHCR,
BIA's presently articulated, incorrect interpretation of PSG subjects refugees to refoule-
ment and violates international refugee law.82 Victims of gang violence seeking refuge in
the United States have faced challenges in meeting the BIA's additional requirement of
social visibility and particularity to qualify as PSG under C-A-
In the last few years, some federal circuit courts have diverged from the BIA's additional
requirements under C-A-. The Seventh Circuit rejected the BIA's social visibility and
particularity requirements in Gatimi v. Holders 3 and Benitez Ramos v. Holder,8 4 respectively.
In Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen.,85 the Third Circuit also rejected the requirements
of social visibility and particularity as superfluous, inconsistent with prior BIA decisions,
and an erroneous adoption of a new standard. In Gaitan v. Holder, while the majority
opinion gave Chevron deference to the BIA's additional requirements for PSG under C-A-,
a member of the Eighth Circuit in a concurring opinion noted that the BIA's additional
requirements were arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with prior decisions.8 6 These
positions in federal circuit courts seem more aligned with the UNHCR's position on the
application of the PSG as described above.
Unlike the other circuits, however, the Ninth Circuit did not reject BIA's additional
requirements in Henriquez-Rivas. Instead, the court reformulated the BIA's definition of
social visibility and broadened its scope. It found that a subset of victims of gang violence
could meet BIA's requirements under Acosta and C-A- for PSG. The court held that an
individual persecuted for possessing a common, shared characteristic with other members
of a group could meet the social visibility requirement if her conduct brings her to the
attention of the persecutor, irrespective of the group's visibility in society.87 The court
further stated that the persecutor's perception of the victim and her group is key in deter-
mining social visibility.88 The court rejected the requirement for external markings of
visibility, on-sight visibility, or literal difference in the group's membership to qualify for
80. UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership in a Particular Social Group" Within
the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, T 5-7, HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002).
81. Id. T 6.
82. Loper, supra note 11, at 21.
83. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F. 3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
84. Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009).
85. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011).
86. Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 680, 682 (8th Cir. 2012).
87. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013).
88. Id. at 1089.
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PSG, and it overturned its prior decisions in Soriano v. Holder 9 and Velasco- Cervantes v.
Holder90 that held otherwise. 91
Finally, another unique aspect of the Ninth Circuit's opinion is its differentiation be-
tween victims of gang violence. The court separated the visible victims of gang-violence,
ones that come to the attention of gang members, or become visible in society through
acts such as public testimony in courts or even a covert action not in public view, 92 from
victims that are targeted just for general opposition to gangs and gang recruitment. 93
This separation of activity by victims in the determination of social visibility (with no
coordinating requirement), the court held, is consistent with the BIA's articulation of PSG
in C-A-.94
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit has diluted the BIA's requirements for PSG as stated
in C-A-; it has added an element of distinguishing victims through their action that might
bring them to the attention of the persecutor, and it has opened the door to a certain
subset of asylum seekers escaping gang violence. This decision followed on the heels of
the U.S. Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in two similar cases that challenged the
BIA's interpretation of PSG in C-A- (later in Matter of S-E-G).95 But given that the Ninth
Circuit may have further widened the circuit court split, we may see another case heading
to the Supreme Court for a final word on this issue. And the UNHCR might have a
unique opportunity to submit its argument to the United States on its alleged violation of
international refugee law norms and its non-refoulement obligations.
89. Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2009).
90. Velasco-Cervantes v. Holder, 593 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2010).
91. Henrique -Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1093.
92. Id. at 1088.
93. Id. at 1093.
94. Id. at 1092 n.13.
95. Gaitan v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 526, 526 (2012). See also Velasquez-Otero v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 524, 524
(2012).
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